



**PEACE** 2016  
**LAB**

# A Fresh Look at Crisis Prevention

Ideas for the Guidelines of the  
Federal Government "Preventing Crises,  
Resolving Conflicts, Building Peace"

**GPPI**  
GLOBAL PUBLIC POLICY  
INSTITUTE

## IMPRINT

This publication summarizes the stakeholder debate on the Guidelines of the Federal Government “Preventing Crises, Resolving Conflicts, Building Peace”. 39 hosts of events and 116 authors of blog contributions brought the PeaceLab2016 debate to life. The Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) facilitated the debate, ran the blog, and developed this summary with financial support from the Foreign Office. During the PeaceLab2016 process, Christian Jetzlsperger, Juliane Kabus and David Remmert were the main focal points for the GPPi team at the Foreign Office. The GPPi team would like to warmly thank them for the excellent collaboration.

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The PeaceLab2016 team at GPPi: Sarah Brockmeier, Philipp Dienstbier, Aurélie Domisse, Philipp Rotmann, Mario Schulz, and Florian Winkler.

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Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi)  
Reinhardtstr. 7, 10117 Berlin  
Telefon +49 30 275 959 75-0  
Fax +49 30 275 959 75-99  
[gppi@gppi.net](mailto:gppi@gppi.net)  
[www.gppi.net](http://www.gppi.net)

# Foreword

On 14 June 2017, the Federal Cabinet adopted the new Guidelines “Preventing Crises, Resolving Conflicts, Building Peace.” They complement the 2016 “White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr” by adding an equal, primarily civilian pillar of German peace and security policy. With this document, we send a strong signal that Germany is going to exercise its growing international responsibility not only militarily, but primarily through political, preventive, and civilian action.

For the first time, the Guidelines provide a clear vision that links our efforts in crisis prevention, conflict resolution and peacebuilding to the values and interests of German foreign policy. The Guidelines define priorities and strengthen our own machinery to even better fulfil the mission “to promote world peace,” enshrined in the German Basic Law.

We owe this accomplishment, first and foremost, to all those who contributed to the PeaceLab2016 debate on the Guidelines throughout the last year: You published more than 100 articles on the PeaceLab2016 blog, hosted 27 events, and discussed with over 1,800 participants at the events. My gratitude goes to all of you! I am delighted that even the most difficult questions were vigorously debated. Many proposals, ideas, and experiences are reflected in the Guidelines.

This is why I also very much appreciate this summary and analysis of the arguments that emerged from PeaceLab2016. They provide a good basis for further discussion. I warmly invite you to continue the open and constructive dialogue beyond the adoption of the Guidelines. I am proud of what we have achieved, but we do know that we can never stop taking “fresh looks” at crisis prevention. On the contrary, the Guidelines provide a starting point to further discuss many specific questions – be it the right approach to security sector reform or the rule of law, be it support to transitional justice or the improvement of our early warning systems. We will need your support for these coming steps as well. The Guidelines mark a new departure. Come join us!




*Sigmar Gabriel, Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs*




# Reach & Participation


(as of 5 July 2017)



## 116 AUTHORS ON THE BLOG



## MORE THAN 1,800 PARTICIPANTS\* IN 27 EVENTS



\* includes multiple participations. More than 1,500 individuals participated; about 200 people joined more than one event.

# The PeaceLab2016 Debate

**Ladies and gentlemen, we need you! We need your critical questions, your experience, your ideas, and your suggestions. We should talk openly about what we are already doing well, and how we can become even better and more efficient.**

With these remarks at an event on 5 July 2016, then-Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier launched the debate on what should be in the Guidelines of the Federal Government “Preventing Crises, Resolving Conflicts, Building Peace”. Between the summer of 2016 and March 2017, officials from the foreign, development, interior, and defense ministries as well as members of parliament from all political parties discussed with members of civil society, academia, implementing organizations, students, the media, the private sector, and with individual citizens. The PeaceLab2016 debate was all about this question: How to improve German policy on crisis prevention, conflict management, and peacebuilding?

Participation in the debate exceeded all expectations. Contributors may well have been wary of another public consultation: PeaceLab2016 followed the recent “Review2014” of German foreign policy and the 2016 White Paper on Security Policy, and it was held in parallel with the drafting of the German Development Report 2017. The organizers of PeaceLab2016 at the Foreign Office and the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) had thus envisaged about five or six events and just under 50 contributions on the PeaceLab2016 blog. In the end, the process attracted more than two dozen organizations that put together a total of 27 conferences and workshops with more than 1,800 participants. 116 authors contributed 132 articles on the blog. The relevant subcommittee in parliament also repeatedly discussed the guidelines. From the debate emerged a “community that had not existed before, the sheer scope and diversity of which resulted only from the PeaceLab2016 process,” as Jörn Grävingholt, co-chairman of the German government’s Advisory Board for Civilian Crisis Prevention, wrote.

This publication aims to provide an impression of the diverse opinions and recommendations that emerged from the small expert roundtables and larger public events, from blog posts and tweets. Rather than trying to cover everything, the editorial team at GPPi tried to select topics and arguments that are representative for the whole debate, that highlight areas of consensus, and that pinpoint disagreements. All blog entries and event reports will remain available at [www.peacelab2016.de](http://www.peacelab2016.de). The Guidelines are available at [www.diplo.de/guidelines](http://www.diplo.de/guidelines).

Youth in the context  
of peaceful settlements  
& conflict transformation



# Germany's Role in Crisis Prevention\* and Peacebuilding

# Germany's Role in Crisis Prevention\* and Peacebuilding

In recent years, millions of people had no choice but to escape from the violence in countries such as Syria and Iraq. Their desperate flight to Europe made clear that not only did the international community fail to prevent conflict but it did not even have a coherent strategy for conflict prevention, and that includes Germany. Here, the crises in the Middle East, the armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine, the Brexit referendum, and the election of Donald Trump in the United States have led to a sense of perpetual crisis. At the same time, the international political and economic order is undergoing profound changes. Both trends translate into new and increased expectations for Germany to contribute to international crisis management.

Against this background, Roderich Kiesewetter (Christian Democratic Union, CDU) and Niels Annen (Social Democratic Party, SPD) called for a political, institutional and financial framework to be established through the guidelines that would enable the government to deploy German contributions to European and international efforts in a strategic way. Most of the other politicians and civil society representatives made similar demands. German involvement in (civilian) crisis prevention, conflict management, and peacebuilding needed to be strengthened as a whole. Based on a culture of reflective learning, it must become more focused on prevention, more coherent, more strategic as well as quintessentially more “political” – a reference to the insight that neither military force nor any amount of advice, construction or equipment alone are able to resolve violent conflict. Only local stakeholders themselves are able to do so, if they manage to change the political balance of power over time, to curb violence, and to handle disputes peacefully. Instead of “giving them technical instructions, or training them for a couple of weeks,” said Franziska Brantner (Green Party), “it will be necessary to truly engage with the given political and cultural context” to provide more effective support.

German and international experts alike expected Germany to exercise growing leadership in managing conflict, particularly in terms of leveraging a stronger European contribution as participants of the PeaceLab2016 workshops on 11 November 2016 in Brussels demanded. In their view, Berlin should not only mediate in specific crises but also drive reforms within the European Union (EU) towards a more coherent common EU foreign and security policy.

\* The German policy community uses the term “crisis prevention” (“Krisenprävention”) where most English speaking experts would use “conflict prevention.” Of course, the German usage comes with many intricacies and conceptual debates of its own. To keep reminding readers of this translation challenge – that the basic concept at the heart of this German debate is *almost but not quite the same as* “conflict prevention” – this publication uses “crisis prevention.”

**Crises are unavoidable. But more strategic political engagement would be Germany's best investment to help pull the world back from its permanent crisis mode.**

*Comfort Ero,  
International Crisis Group*

**It's about providing the primacy of civilian approaches with considerably more muscle and clear guidance.**

*Winfried Nachtwei,  
Advisory Board for Civilian Crisis Prevention*

**Don't run social change programs as if they were industrial maintenance procedures: technical, cost effective, and following a strict schedule. Social change is too unruly.**

*Erwin van Veen,  
Clingendael Institute*

**While Germany is firmly in the western camp, the fact that it has not embraced all the western adventures puts it in a good position to act as a bridge-builder.**

*Jean-Marie Guéhenno,  
International Crisis Group*

**From the perspective of many countries in the Global South, its lack of a colonial burden makes Germany look welcome as a partner to mediate in peace processes.**

*Hans-Joachim Giessmann,  
Berghof Foundation*

**Getting better at coordination and improving the way interfaces are managed is fine, but integrating different policy fields must not become a central dogma.**

*Bärbel Dieckmann,  
Welthungerhilfe*

Jean-Marie Guéhenno (International Crisis Group) also argued that Germany was uniquely positioned to strengthen Europe's role in conflict prevention. Trusted in Eastern and Central Europe, Germany could help reconcile Europe's two competing geographic priorities – the eastern neighborhood on the one hand, and Africa, particularly the Maghreb and Sahel regions, on the other.


Isabel Pfaff (Süddeutsche Zeitung) and Mathias Krämer (University of the Federal Armed Forces Hamburg) agreed that Germany should be willing to start prioritizing certain regions and specifically increase its efforts on the African continent. In doing so, Germany can build on its substantial credibility in Europe and beyond – based on its political and economic weight, the way the country has been dealing with its own past, and its firm commitment to multilateralism.

The consensus about expectations had its limits, however. From the French point of view, for instance, Germany will still need to work on translating the ambition, announced in the 2016 White Paper on German Security Policy, of establishing full-spectrum military capabilities to reality. “Even post-conflict situations call for a versatile presence, able to shift from civilian-military peace-building activities to robust peacekeeping to asymmetric warfare to direct combat,” argued Manuel Lafont Rapnouil (European Council on Foreign Relations, Paris). From this perspective, Berlin is clearly expected to accept greater risks – both politically and militarily. Not even the German advocates of a stronger integration of civilian and military contributions went this far in their demands, let alone the opponents of such an integration.

A key goal of the 2004 Action Plan on “Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peace-Building” and a key piece of its added value for German foreign policy was to strengthen civilian tools and civil society programs. Many activists demand that the new guidelines, which are replacing the Action Plan, must under no circumstances fall behind these achievements: the primacy of civilian approaches, the ambition to subordinate all government ministries to a coherent policy promoting peace, a comprehensive notion of human security, and regular reporting requirements of the government to parliament and the public.

# Diversity of Topics and Responses

This figure represents the wide range of topics covered in the PeaceLab2016 debate using the blog's tagging system (including event reports). Some topics inspired more authors and speakers to contribute than others. On yet other topics, few contributions reached very large audiences, measured by numbers of participants in events and the number of views of the respective blog posts.





# A Vision for Building Peace

Juliane Kabus

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# A Vision for Building Peace

The desire for an overarching “vision of peace” that would define key principles for German engagement before, during, and after crises was a central part of the Peacelab2016 debate. Elements of such a vision were intensely debated in at least 18 blog contributions and five workshops. Expectations were high: participants hoped for the vision to recalibrate or even solve long-standing tensions between values and interests, civilian and military means, prevention and reaction, (short-term) security and (long-term) peace. Participants’ own proposals pointed in very different directions.

## “CIVILIAN PRIMACY:” CIVILIAN APPROACHES, CIVILIAN TOOLS, CIVILIAN FUNDS?

A pivotal part of this discussion was about how to best express “civilian primacy” over military approaches and means, and related to that, whether or not the new guidelines should define their subject matter explicitly as “civilian” in their title. Many German authors and workshop participants demanded, in Martina Fischer’s (Bread for the World) words, “for the blatant imbalance between financial resources for civilian and military instruments to be corrected.” Doing so would also ensure that military forces would no longer be employed for tasks for which other – civilian – actors were better suited. In the eyes of many participants, more attention and resources devoted to civilian instruments would almost automatically translate into a more effective focus on longer-term violence prevention.

Germany’s 2017 budget already shows a 70-30 ratio between defense spending on the one hand and foreign policy and aid expenditures on the other hand. The current debate about higher defense spending is likely to further tip this imbalance toward the military. Instead, “we need to discuss a real strategy for ensuring our collective peace and security with our European neighbors, not carry on with rhetorical fights about the size of a single instrument within that strategy,” stressed Philipp Rotmann (Global Public Policy Institute). “Both defense and crisis prevention require greater German contributions.” This would require massive investments in political analysis, strategic leadership, and civilian instruments. Participants disagreed on whether such a buildup should come at the expense of the military, or rather – in line with the integrated approach – in parallel with that of Bundeswehr.

**To establish a focus on peace is more than just a normative posture. It is a necessary precondition to achieve a sustainable and global security policy.**

*Ursula Schröder,  
Freie Universität Berlin*

**We need bold proposals on how to push back against the dominance of the military in foreign policy.**

*Kathrin Vogler,  
The Left*

**Increasingly complex crises and conflicts require a more integrated approach than ever before between diplomacy, development, civilian actors, and the armed forces.**

*Ursula von der Leyen (CDU),  
Minister of Defense*

**It is not enough to reaffirm the primacy of politics; concrete ideas backed by actual leverage and ultimately actions are needed for political solutions.**

*Elisa Lux,  
formerly United Nations*

**Prevention must be possible, even when Syria is on fire.**

*PeaceLab2016 workshop on 20 October 2016*

**The German government should be courageous: It should present a concept for building peace that encapsulates all of Germany's international policies.**

*Cay Gabbe,  
former German public servant*

## **THE PRIMACY OF POLITICS: FIRST THE STRATEGY, THEN THE TOOLS**

Ultimately, argued Klaus Naumann (Hamburg Institute for Social Research), the key was not “civilian primacy” but the “primacy of politics”: the instruments of crisis management must not become ends in themselves, they need to be embedded in a political strategy. “Stabilizing fragile political institutions or training specific security forces are not political goals as such. They must instead be seen as short- or mid-term programs in a specific phase of a conflict, subordinated to the overall political goal to build peace,” argued Ursula Schröder (Freie Universität Berlin) who echoed a number of others in this regard.

Many other participants also stressed the importance of implementing programs in a less technocratic manner, as well as strengthening the role of embassies on the ground and boosting political analysis and communication. Such efforts would enable actors in the field and in Berlin to recognize opportunities and adapt their work to changing circumstances.

## **THE PRIMACY OF PREVENTION: CREATING SEPARATE STRUCTURES AND FUNDS**

While prevention is definitely a political priority, in reality the greater part of the German government’s financial, human and political resources are dedicated to managing crises that have already erupted. The conceptual focus on “crisis prevention” already implies a short-term approach.

Most participants wanted the government to prioritize preventive and long-term approaches, instead of merely focusing on reacting to crises and threats. Giving priority to prevention would have consequences for decision-making, budgeting, and staffing. One proposal suggested establishing a separate inter-ministerial coordination body for early warning and early action. In such a forum, discussions about early warning would no longer have to compete for meeting time with those about responding to ongoing crises. Similarly, a distinct budget line for prevention could ensure that available resources were not used up for the never-ending needs of acute crises.

## **POLICY COHERENCE: ARE THERE JUST FOUR MINISTRIES IN CHARGE OF PEACE?**

“Inspired by the determination to promote world peace,” says a part of the first sentence of the German Basic Law. Is this just one political goal among others, such as securing jobs? Or should the promotion of peace become an overriding principle for Germany’s entire interaction with

the world? Most PeaceLab2016 participants demanded a clear choice to establish an overarching objective of promoting peace, based on both Germany's own interest and its moral responsibility. Doing so would make it a cross-cutting task for all government ministries, not just those of foreign affairs, development, defense, and interior – an understanding that those four ministers Sigmar Gabriel (writing in its previous capacity as minister for economic affairs), Ursula von der Leyen, Gerd Müller, and Thomas de Maizière already expressed in the debate. The PeaceLab2016 workshop on 8 September 2016 with regard to the Agenda 2030 focused on overcoming policymaking siloes, too.

Jörn Grävingholt (Advisory Board for Civilian Crisis Prevention) was one of many who demanded greater critical reflection about how government policies directly and indirectly influence violent conflicts. Christoph Bongard (Forum Civil Peace Service) suggested an inter-ministerial “peacebuilding test” to review each policy for compatibility with the constitutional goal of promoting peace. Such a test could build on and further develop methods known in the development sector, such as the “do-no-harm” principle or the Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment.

## PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS, PREVENTING MASS ATROCITIES

Protecting human rights, preventing crises, and building peace should be inseparable from the perspective of many PeaceLab2016 participants. Human rights protection must have absolute primacy in German foreign policy, they argued, since the concept of indivisible and universal human rights does not allow for establishing priorities. At the same time, political, financial and staff resources are finite, and conflicts between human rights promotion and other political goals, such as export promotion, are inevitable.

A number of German and international experts asked the German government to prioritize mass atrocity prevention in the new guidelines. In light of the many possible conflict risks competing for attention, they argued, making atrocity prevention a top priority was necessary to focus limited resources on those conflicts where the consequences are gravest.

Atrocity prevention should complement rather than compete with conflict prevention, wrote Gregor Hofmann (Peace Research Institute Frankfurt), among others. A focus on mass atrocities, however, could draw particular attention towards defending humanitarian law, establishing safe areas for civilians, and preventing acts of revenge or victor's justice. For this purpose, Germany needed to train more security forces and to create monitoring systems to make sure that trained security forces did not commit mass atrocities themselves. Another important source of leverage

**Disarmament, arms control and a restrictive arms export policy can thus help prevent conflicts from turning into wars and civil wars.**

*Ute Finckh-Krämer,  
SPD*

**The German government should affirm that it is a core collective security interest and moral responsibility to act to prevent atrocities.**

*Tod Lindberg,  
Stanford University*



**PeaceLab2016** @PeaceLab2016 13 Nov 2016  
German crisis prevention should focus on preventing atrocities – recommendations of #PeaceLab2016 workshop in Berlin: [www.peacelab2016.de/ ...](http://www.peacelab2016.de/)



10



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**Overcoming systematic violations of human rights and discrimination will always be political. Such efforts are thus prone to cause conflict over the medium term.**

*Beate Rudolf,  
German Institute for Human Rights*

**Peace is usually achieved at the local level. Therefore, the prevention and transformation of violent conflicts must also be grounded locally.**

*Jürgen Deile,  
Civil Peace Service*

**Social change has to be brought to life. We must stop this administrative approach.**

*Franziska Brantner,  
Green Party*

was the systematic enforcement of international criminal law during and after conflicts, argued Pauline Brosch (Global Public Policy Institute).

Of course, the protection of human rights goes far beyond preventing mass atrocities. One area in which Germany should take action, PeaceLab2016 participants suggested, was the protection of human rights defenders and democracy activists who are facing increasing pressure. They argued that German diplomats should closely monitor the human rights situation on the ground and engage in regular exchange with activists. However, the German government should carefully weigh on a case-by-case basis how to best support human rights defenders: public pressure is not always the best choice – under some circumstances it may further increase the danger for them.

PeaceLab2016 also discussed dangerous dilemmas and tradeoffs between preventing crises and protecting human rights. For instance, issues of individual criminal responsibility and reparations can be very contentious. For this reason, some participants argued, it was important to talk to all parties involved and to employ context-sensitive instruments of conflict management. Participants underlined that human rights promotion is naturally a lengthy process with frequent setbacks. Thus, institutional learning, tactical innovation and flexibility were essential to make progress at all.

## **SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION AND CONTEXT SENSITIVITY**

Another subject of discussion was the tension between two equally necessary principles: context sensitivity on the one hand, which was seen to limit the pace of social change, and social transformation on the other hand, without which there is no way out of conflict. In countries such as Iraq, argued Markus Ederer (Foreign Office) at the PeaceLab2016 workshop on 14 December 2016, stabilization takes precedence over democratization. Other contributions, however, argued that without ambitious goals of transforming societies it would be impossible to secure German and European interests and values. The goal should be to guarantee “comprehensive human security for everyone,” said Elisabeth Strohscheidt (MISEREOR).

Local conditions decide whether or not our expectations are viable or need to be adapted, many argued. Instead of exporting blueprints, donors should enable local actors to lead their own democratic transitions, helping only in creating spaces for dialogue and action. Local culture frames every intervention: only culturally sensitive interventions could win local acceptance.

# Peace Lab 2016 - Krise

## Berlin



PEACE LAB  
KRISENPRÄVENTION WEITER DENKEN.

# Approaches & Instruments of Building Peace



# Approaches & Instruments of Building Peace

Which approaches and instruments need to be improved to make our attempts to build peace more effective? The PeaceLab2016 participants and authors focused specifically on mediation, security sector assistance and reform, transitional justice, and the rule of law. While many blog posts dealt with United Nations (UN) peace operations, missions conducted by the EU, OSCE or NATO mostly came up in a PeaceLab2016 workshop on 13 October 2016 in Brussels. The plea to always adequately consider the potential and the needs of young people and women cut across the entire discussion on instruments.

## CONTEXTUAL DIFFERENCES AND TRADEOFFS

The PeaceLab2016 debate covered the entire range of building peace: the longer-term, structural prevention of conflict and violence, the short-term prevention of acute crises, conflict management and stabilization, and sustainable peacebuilding in the long run. “The enormous opportunity costs of post-war reconstruction and the social costs of mass movements of refugees and migrants,” argued Rüdiger König (Foreign Office), “are disproportionately larger than the funds spent on preventive diplomacy, crisis prevention or crisis management.” While some contributors questioned this assumption that effective prevention was cost-efficient, nonetheless they agreed that “preventing is better than healing,” as Nicole Deitelhoff and Christopher Daase (Peace Research Institute Frankfurt) put it.

“Addressing the structural causes of crises and conflicts must be the main focus of our initiatives,” wrote Gerd Müller (CSU), the Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development – which is the main instrument to tackle the structural, political and social causes of violent conflict, according to Müller. “We need a comprehensive approach to development for human security.” When prevention fails, the key is to quickly curb the violence and to set up new political channels for dialogue that re-enable non-violent attempts at conflict resolution. Beyond crisis diplomacy, there is an increasing need for short-term, civilian stabilization instruments to quickly and flexibly improve the living conditions of the affected population, argued the former Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, among others. From the perspective of the German government, stabilization is thus an intermediate goal on the path towards sustainable peace, as Development Minister Gerd Müller also emphasized. However, the Foreign Office and the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development still lacked a shared concept of what

**Where half of the population is left out, no conflicts can be solved and no peace be achieved.**

*Sonja Schiffrers and Vera Lamprecht,  
Polis180*

**The strategic goal of stabilization is to support a political process that prevents or ends escalations of violence and creates the conditions for a sufficiently inclusive political settlement, which fosters sustainable peace in the long run.**

*PeaceLab2016 workshop on 19 October 2016*

**Reconstructing a road may be an urgent and meaningful stabilisation activity; but it will only serve a long-term peacebuilding purpose if we build up the civilian capacity to maintain and administer a country's road system.**

*Helga Schmid,  
European External Action Service*

Germany needs to get better at analyzing what drives decision-makers and at building trust and lasting relationships with political leaders in fragile states.

Richard Gowan,  
European Council on Foreign Relations



**Gerrit Kurtz** @GerritKurtz 8 Sep 2016  
Conflict prevention requires more staff, training, resources & open organisational culture. My post @PeaceLab2016

1 8 11

Sarah Bressan @bressansar 21 Nov 2016  
Interesting suggestions! What about the @eu\_eeas instead of 28x effort for every country? @PeaceLab2016 @GerritKurtz

1 1 1

**Gerrit Kurtz** @GerritKurtz 21 Nov 2016  
@bressansar @PeaceLab2016  
Bilateral diplomacy will always be able to draw on historical relations & networks that @eu\_eeas doesn't have

1 1 2

stabilization means, some participants highlighted. Such a common understanding would be necessary to improve the transitions between short-term, reactive stabilization instruments and longer term, development-oriented instruments for consolidating peace.

The crucial question, as it became apparent in many workshops and contributions, is how conflicting goals and tradeoffs are being managed. In the short-term, modesty and realistic ambitions would be required, rather than grand plans for democratic transition. In the long-term, however, a majority of contributions argued that social transformation were decisive for sustainable peace.

### POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT: STRENGTHENING DIPLOMACY AND MEDIATION

Neither military nor technocratic means can deliver peace, only those proverbial “political solutions” may – everyone participating in the PeaceLab2016 debate appeared to agree with that. Political solutions, first and foremost, depend on political engagement. In this regard, participants identified two major gaps in Germany.

First, it is primarily the Foreign Office that is expected to analyze conflict risks, engage in preventive diplomacy, develop political strategies, and lead their implementation. But in recent years, huge increases in program funds administered by the Foreign Office have created an imbalance: there is a lack of diplomats who could exert political control over programming in a way that allows for effective adaptation to short-term changes of the conflict dynamics. “Everywhere you turn, the ministry lacks personnel to back up its commitments,” argued Sarah Brockmeier (Global Public Policy Institute). “Although German politicians never cease to emphasize the need for talks on Syria,” for example, “nobody is in the region to do the talking. Even with increased efficiency Germany will need to significantly increase the number of its diplomats.”

Second, there was a broad consensus that German capacities for conflict mediation and mediation support needed to be expanded as part of the “German brand” which, participants argued, provided for an excellent starting point together with the significant institutional capacity that already exists. On top of this, the federal government should, for example, establish a separate module for mediation in the training of diplomats. On the ground, women’s participation in track 1 peace processes should be ensured, for instance by instituting gender quotas. The German government and civil society organizations could also increase the role of mediation methodology in trainings. This would help to move beyond the mediators’ political influence alone as a condition for success and allow them to leverage methodological knowledge

as well. Finally, members of parliament and elder statesmen could be used more often to act as mediators, participants suggested.

## SECURITY: FROM TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO POLITICAL REFORM

Another uncontested demand was for prioritizing support to state partners in providing human security, i.e., the security of the population rather than (only) that of the ruling elites. A dozen blog posts and several workshops were dedicated to security sector reform (SSR) as well as the German government's "Enable and Enhance" initiative, which aims to train and equip security forces.

The federal government must prohibit the export of weapons to conflict zones, demanded Stefan Liebich (The Left) and others. Even those participants that were in favor of train and equip programs as a necessary tool for stabilization emphasized the possible risks, too: equipment, even weapons, could fall into the wrong hands and could then be used as instruments for repression. Germany needs a comprehensive security assistance strategy to guide its "Enable and Enhance" initiative, argued some participants. Such a strategy would need to openly address the trade-offs in security assistance and impose strict conditions on arms exports and training.

Most contributions, however, did not stop there: train and equip programs were ineffective at best and counterproductive at worst, some authors argued, unless based on a solid political economy analysis of the relevant context and possible impact pathways, and implemented as a tool in support of clear political objectives. Participants underlined that German government programming was yet to reflect the insight that the politics of security in fragile contexts – who gets to deploy force for what purpose – touches directly upon the heart of political power struggles. These were eminently political and highly combustible dynamics that advisors, trainers and equipment alone could never influence effectively.

All too often, argued participants, Germany had failed to offer senior political engagement when the conditions for change were in place. Patient, long-term work on the ground could help open such windows of opportunity for reform. For this to work, however, German foreign policy would need to be willing to engage with sensitive questions of power inside the security sector and stop leaving the strategic direction of assistance and reform programs to its implementing partners and military advisory groups.



**Philipp Rotmann** @PhilippRotmann 11 Dec 2016  
#PeaceLab2016 discussed arms exports, both as fueling violence & to equip responsible security forces. With @GermanyDiplo on stage.

1 3 3

**Gerrit Kurtz** @GerritKurtz 11 Dec 2016  
@PhilippRotmann @GermanyDiplo  
Arms exports are a recurring factor that undermines progressive conflict prevention. Need @BMWi\_Bund on board

1 1

**More importantly, SSR processes must be backed up with political capital. A personal conversation with a minister or a state secretary is often far more powerful in creating change than any long-term training or advisory program.**

*Steffen Eckhard,  
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität Munich,  
and Marius Müller-Hennig,  
Friedrich Ebert Foundation*

**It will often be necessary to determine standards of “good enough governance” that ensure an adequate level of the rule of law in institutional as well as in normative terms.**

*Matthias Kötter,  
Collaborative Research Center (SPB) 700*

**Sustained impunity is an obstacle to the emergence of the rule of law. Old and new elites must not be above the law either.**

*Sabine Kurtenbach,  
GIGA Institute of Latin American Studies*

## **A FRESH LOOK AT THE RULE OF LAW: INVESTING IN TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND TARGETED PROSECUTIONS**

Germany enjoys international recognition for its expertise on the rule of law, Justice Minister Heiko Maas (SPD) argued in the debate. But what does that mean, if the key lesson learned from practical experience is that promoting the rule of law, in particular human rights, is only successful when norms are developed indigenously rather than imported from the West? Markus Böckenförde (Center for Global Cooperation, University of Duisburg-Essen) was one of several participants who cautioned that political interventions in legislative processes and law enforcement did usually not achieve their objectives but rather undermined the natural evolution of the rule of law. At the same time, it was considered important to note that traditional ways of arbitration were generally more effective and sustainable than the formal justice system.

Cultural adaptation is equally important, participants argued, when it comes to external support for coming to terms with past violence in the context of transitional justice. Germany should do more in this area, participants demanded, building on its own process of learning from the past and its high level of credibility. However, Germany should not try to export one particular model of “dealing with the past” and rather focus on supporting local approaches. To do so, participants suggested, the German government should make support to transitional justice and dealing with the past a new priority. An inter-ministerial strategy for the field could be the framework for assisting in these complex political processes and for sustaining partnerships and trust in the long term. Such a strategy would also highlight the links to other policy areas.

Another topic in the discussion focused on the role of international criminal law in crisis prevention. Targeted and coherent sanctions regimes by states and multilateral organizations could help avert potential crises. Germany also had room for improvement when it came to the credible prosecution of war criminals on German territory, according to participants who criticized the lack of resources at the Office of the federal public prosecutor. Taking determined action against instigators and perpetrators – for instance, by initiating criminal prosecutions according to the German Code of Crimes against International Law and using the European arrest warrant – could have a significant deterrent effect.

## UNITED NATIONS PEACE OPERATIONS: MORE CONTRIBUTIONS WITH GREATER ADDED VALUE

More than 20 blog posts and participants of three workshops agreed: Germany should engage more with the United Nations. UN conflict prevention efforts were crucial to address political crises before they escalate into armed conflict. Germany should provide more staff to international organizations, some participants argued, specifically to those peace operations in which German contributions could generate clear added value.

Peace operations particularly need police officers and (civilian) experts such as forensic specialists or specialists for organized crime. Participants agreed that Germany urgently needs to establish a common deployment pool of police officers from both the federal level and the states (*Länder*). In addition, Germany should offer more training and language courses to such officers. This also means that Germany should be more realistic about what risks its personnel may face and not withdraw staff from UN missions when they are needed most: “After all, peacekeepers go where no one else is willing or able to go,” Elisa Lux (formerly United Nations) pointed out.

It was also important, argued several participants, to provide peacekeeping missions with key military capabilities such as reconnaissance drones and helicopters. This particular point was controversial. For some contributors, the integrated deployment of civilian, military and police components in UN peacekeeping missions provided a role model. “To work together in operations planning, logistics, and the analytical, self-critical evaluation of peacekeeping missions is to work more effectively. New synergies can emerge when the disciplinary boundaries are overcome,” wrote Ekkehard Griep (United Nations Association of Germany). To ensure effective early warning and the protection of civilians, peacekeeping missions needed robust mandates, argued Daniel Maier (UN peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo), for example. German civilian, military and police contributions should therefore all be increased and better coordinated.

In contrast, Stefan Liebich (The Left) was one of several contributors who were worried about a further “militarization” of German foreign policy. Christine Schweitzer (Federation for Social Defence) agreed and made the case for bolstering exclusively civilian political missions, including for the protection of civilians. She also demanded strengthening unarmed civilian peacekeeping by NGOs.



**Richard Gowan** @RichardGowan1 11 May 2017  
If #Trump budget cuts mean decline of @UNPeacekeeping, #EU can help #Africa fill crisis response gap, @PeaceLab2016:

**Moving from Peacekeeping to Prevention at...**  
The United Nations (UN) may be on the verge of major changes to how it manages crises. A mix of political and financial pressures could spell the...  
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# Structures & Partnerships for Building Peace

# Structures & Partnerships for Building Peace

The PeaceLab2016 debate generated numerous ideas and proposals on how the German government could get better at building peace by enhancing its structures, procedures, and partnerships – for instance with the European Union, civil society actors, implementing partners, and regional organizations. Joint strategy development and better coordination among key ministries, the creation of larger multi-year funding mechanisms, and the establishment of a real culture of evaluation and learning were among the key recommendations.

## EARLY WARNING AND EARLY ACTION

Several authors on the blog along with the participants of a PeaceLab2016 workshop on 26 October 2016 critically reviewed the existing mechanisms of early warning and early action and developed proposals for their improvement. A lot of open questions remained. Do data-based predication models, for example, fail to account for the complexity of paths to escalation, or do they merit further development, building on methodological advances made in recent years? Jens Stappenbeck (Genocide Alert) warned experts not to simply blame decision-makers and their presumed lack of political will for missed opportunities of prevention. He argued that there is indeed room to increase the accuracy of quantitative as well as qualitative models.

Beyond the debate about data, contributors agreed that timely action primarily depended on good qualitative political analysis. One proposal was to develop and discuss possible conflict scenarios on a regular basis, for example in the context of an inter-ministerial body. Doing so could make it easier to keep multiple alternative scenarios in view and identify pivotal events. In particular, to bring in external expertise from civil society and international partners could help to avoid groupthink. For this purpose, the federal government could build a neutrally moderated, digital prediction platform.

Diplomats played a crucial role in early action, according to many contributors. They are familiar with local political actors and able to get involved in political processes. The German government should therefore deploy more and better-prepared personnel to potential crisis zones and delegate more authority to them, several experts recommended.

**Germany needs an early warning system that allows for more exchange between experts and decision-makers, reacts in a quick and unbureaucratic manner, and rewards inconvenient warnings.**

*Christoph Meyer,  
King's College London*

**The federal government needs more diplomats in crisis-affected countries to bridge the gap between early warning and early action.**

*Gerrit Kurtz,  
Global Public Policy Institute  
& King's College London*

**Joint analyses of contexts and risks also provide necessary guidance for implementers in crisis areas.**

*Tanja Gömmer,  
Deutsche Gesellschaft für internationale  
Zusammenarbeit*

**The federal government should treat civil society as an independent partner on an equal footing.**

*Elisabeth Strohscheidt,  
MISEREOR*

## COORDINATING MINISTRIES, DEVELOPING STRATEGIES, PLANNING PROJECTS

One of the most important expectations on the part of many PeaceLab2016 contributors was for the new guidelines to set up more effective exchange and decision-making structures, mainly between the ministries of foreign affairs, development, defense and the interior. “To effectively work together towards shared objectives requires clear goals, balanced capacities, and respect for different mandates. The vanity of individual ministries and organizations often runs counter to this requirement, effectively undercutting the joint aspiration to prevent crises,” as Winfried Nachtwei (Advisory Board for Civilian Crisis Prevention) put it, similarly to many other contributions. Extensive inter-ministerial trainings and joint exercises were proposed to help improve cooperation between the military, police, civilian experts, and aid workers.

One possible starting point for more effective cooperation with regard to a particular country might be joint situation analyses and impact assessments. On this basis, ministries could develop joint political strategies defining common objectives and instruments, which would need to be jointly evaluated and adapted on a regular basis. To effectively pursue both short-term and longer-term objectives, it might help to introduce multi-year strategy cycles in a way that would allow for flexible adaptation on short notice.

Developing inter-ministerial strategies requires well-established structures and processes. Many contributions supported strengthening the existing “Inter-ministerial Steering Group for Civilian Crisis Prevention,” for instance by linking it to the level of state secretaries or by creating a new, more effective organizational structure. One suggested model envisaged a political mandate provided by the participating ministries, clear leadership by the Foreign Office, and a shared budget. ARD journalist Christian Thiels suggested an alternative to this model: a non-partisan national security advisor with cabinet rank, heading a strengthened Federal Security Council – the cabinet committee, chaired by the chancellor, in charge of approving arms exports and coordinating German security policy – with more staff and greater competences vis-à-vis the ministries. The proposal to create an overarching National Peace Council went even further: such an entirely new body would not only subordinate the four core ministries but every single ministry and therefore all areas of policy to the overarching principle of promoting peace.

## WORKING WITH NON-STATE ACTORS

Numerous authors focused on the role of civil society in crisis prevention, conflict management and peacebuilding – both in Germany and beyond. At the PeaceLab2016 workshop on 5 October 2016 these questions were at the forefront. Within Germany, the Advisory Board for Civilian

Crisis Prevention, which convenes representatives from civil society and academia, is currently “little more than an accessory,” complained Catherine Devaux (Amnesty International). If it were equipped with a budget and a stronger mandate, however, the board could become a key partner for the government. For instance, as was suggested during the debate, the board could commission its own studies or issue statements on broad strategic questions.

Participants argued that it was equally important for the government to work closely with civil society partners abroad. Close contacts with civil society partners can help actively generate knowledge about local society, facilitate learning from local partners, and better take into consideration their needs, interests and potentials. In principle, some participants stressed, it was important to be ready to talk to anyone who is willing to talk – whether they share Germany’s values or not. But one had to tread carefully: “Not every actor turns out to be trustworthy, even if they appeared so at first. For every interlocutor, it is necessary to consider their motives and interests,” explained Miriam Müller (Hamburg Institute for Social Research). The federal government and German civil society organizations had to put up the necessary time and money to review and select local civil society partners. Religious communities can also be important peacebuilders. In addition to classic civil society groups, private companies could not only be donors but also active partners with considerable political leverage.

A strong and widely shared demand was to find new ways to fund civil society, including smaller NGOs, in a more reliable way and over longer periods of time, as well as to design projects in a more long-term and flexible manner. “Political changes do not follow the calendar,” wrote Almut Wieland-Karimi (Center for International Peace Operations), for example. Existing ways to commit multi-year funding, particularly from the Foreign Office, “may be a small remedy, but they do not solve the problem. This is a matter for the next government.” To solve the problem would require statutory changes through the budget committee in parliament.

## **EXCHANGE BETWEEN ACADEMIA AND POLICYMAKING**

Think tank experts and university researchers contributed about one third of the blog posts and actively participated in almost every workshop, in stark contrast to the often-invoked silence between political science and foreign policy.

However, many of these contributions revealed the interest to more critically debate mutual expectations and the added value of stronger exchange – both within academic circles as well as between academics and practitioners. Evidence-based policy advice can work only if academic findings and criticism is presented in a user-friendly way. The reverse is true as well:

**Companies have to make sure that human rights violations are not tacitly condoned. This is part of their human rights due diligence obligations.**

*Bärbel Kofler,  
SPD*

**Project implementation rules must ensure effective financial support in the context of restrictive laws and continuous digital surveillance.**

*Katrin Kinzelbach,  
Global Public Policy Institute*

**Peace and conflict researchers can only be a thorn in the side of policymakers if their research is relevant. And it will only be relevant if it generates knowledge and then presents that knowledge in a way that is useful for policymakers. Otherwise it will only be ignored.**

*Nicole Deitelhoff and Christopher Daase,  
Peace Research Institute Frankfurt*

**Why not make an annual 'Peace Review' conference a fixture in the Berlin calendar?**

*Ulrich Schneekener,  
German Foundation for Peace Research*

if politicians, parties and officials really wanted more targeted and evidence-based advice, they would have to adapt their routines such that even inconvenient insights stand a chance of being heard, argued Lars Brozus (German Institute for International and Security Affairs), for example. This may result in different formats that might make this exchange more productive for both sides, wrote Christoph Weller (University of Augsburg).

Academics and practitioners agreed that the demand for new insights by far exceeded not only the present supply but also the existing capacity of relevant academic disciplines and research institutions. To expand the German “peace architecture,” the German Foundation for Peace Research could be strengthened or new professorships for security policy established at universities.

### **A CULTURE OF EVALUATION AND LEARNING**

**In light of the mixed results, we need to ask ourselves more clearly under what conditions specific strategies can be successful, and under what conditions they cannot.**

*Ursula Schröder,  
Freie Universität Berlin*

“We must be cognizant of the personal qualities that we as outsiders, as international NGO representatives, diplomats, and mediators, bring to building peace. We influence conflict dynamics. We need to look in the mirror, reflect on who we are and how our actions affect situations: then we can ask what it really takes to be effective peacebuilders ourselves.” With these words, Jonathan Cohen (Conciliation Resources) illustrated the consensus demand from the PeaceLab2016 debate for Germany to improve its evaluation practice and create a culture of learning. To do so would begin with professional knowledge management and comprehensive pre-deployment training. But it takes more than that: a real culture of learning would mean to honestly take stock of lessons (and best practices), and to subject the implementation and impact of various instruments to transparent evaluation.

**We need monitoring & evaluation that create continuous, evidence-based learning and feedback loops to guide implementation, inform shifts of strategy, and track progress toward the project's goals, even as these goals may evolve.**

*Andrew Blum,  
University of San Diego*

In designing evaluations, it is important not only to ensure high standards of quality but also to question widely shared myths. As many contributors argued, for example, ex-post evaluations are often less effective than “formative” evaluations accompanying the program cycle. By creating opportunities for timely intermediate assessments, they enable effective adaptation and ultimately higher impact. Donors would need to work more closely with implementing partners and invest more in data collection and analysis. While individual voices proposed an independent institution for strategic evaluation, others would be satisfied if evaluations were systematically planned and their findings discussed jointly between ministries.

However, several members of parliament argued that the fundamental decisions on German government action (or inaction) are taken in parliament. Thus, even the best evaluations would not relieve the members of their responsibility to weigh political decisions and to facilitate the learning process for society.

# Conclusion: Looking Ahead on Crisis Prevention

On 14 June 2017, after almost a year of “PeaceLab2016,” the German government adopted the new Guidelines “Preventing Crises, Resolving Conflicts, Building Peace.” Many of the demands from the PeaceLab2016 debate were included, others were not.

The many participants – politicians, activists, academics, practitioners – did not always agree on the best approach and the best tools to better and more effectively prevent crises, resolve conflicts, and promote peace. Despite the numerous workshops and articles, some questions remained unanswered: How exactly should the government deal with tradeoffs? Which compromises are smart and acceptable, which are foul? How can academics and civil society better help the government to reach shared objectives? What risks and opportunities arise from the new digital technologies? The Guidelines have announced follow-up efforts in which at least some of these questions may be addressed.

As many PeaceLab2016 participants underlined, however, this will not be enough. Germany needs to have a strategic debate about peace and security: How much is Germany willing to pay for its international commitments? What is the logic behind the distribution of funds and the design of instruments between diplomacy, development, and defense? Such a strategy debate needs a greater audience than PeaceLab2016, which remained largely confined to the expert community. The government can contribute by explaining its own policy choices more. The Bundestag could significantly elevate the topic, for example by holding a regular debate on Germany’s peace and security strategy.

To keep the debate alive and as lively as it has become, practitioners and experts from civil society, academia, and implementing agencies alike will need to get better connected, speak more with policymakers, and provide policy recommendations to the right places. The new “Peace Review” conference, to be organized by the German Foundation for Peace Research and the Advisory Board on Civilian Crisis Prevention in early 2018, would be a good place to bring the next stage of the discussion to life. There is no end to taking “fresh looks” at crisis prevention.

**So far, neither politicians nor academics have found good answers to these challenges.**

*Elisabeth Strohscheidt,  
MISEREOR*

**Strategic communication should no longer be treated as an accessory, but as a core element of foreign, security and development policy.**

*Sarah Brockmeier,  
Global Public Policy Institute*

# Contributions to the PeaceLab2016 Blog

**Zivil, frühzeitig und langfristig: Krisenprävention weiter denken**

*by Frank-Walter Steinmeier (Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs)*

**Langfristiger, politischer und kohärenter: Wir brauchen einen Nationalen Friedensrat**

*by Franziska Brantner, MP (Green Party)*

**Interessengeleitet, strategisch und priorisiert: Für eine realistische zivile Krisenprävention**

*by Roderich Kiesewetter, MP (Christian Democratic Union, CDU)*

**Präventiver, strategischer, substantieller: Krisenprävention weiterentwickeln**

*by Niels Annen, MP (Social Democratic Party, SPD)*

**Zivile, gewaltfreie Konfliktbearbeitung stärken statt für Militärisches vereinnahmen!**

*by Kathrin Vogler, MP (The Left)*

**Mit mehr Mitteln für Prävention den Primat der zivilen Ansätze stärken**

*by Martina Fischer (Bread for the World)*

**Trusted in the East, Germany should lead more in the South**

*by Jean-Marie Guéhenno (International Crisis Group)*

**Vorrang für gewaltfreie Intervention: Das zivile Peacekeeping stärker nutzen!**

*by Christine Schweitzer (Federation for Social Defence)*

**Krisenprävention weiter denken**

*by Philipp Rotmann (Global Public Policy Institute)*

**Die Konfliktbearbeitung muss militärische und zivile Mittel klarer trennen**

*by Corinna Hauswedell (Forschungsstätte der Evangelischen Studiengemeinschaft)*

**Krisenhäufung ohne Ende: Schneller besser werden!**

*by Winfried Nachtwei (Advisory Board for Civilian Crisis Prevention)*

**Zutaten eines erfolgreichen Ansatzes: Ressort-übergreifender Wille zum Handeln, Lernen, und Durchhalten**

*by Bodo von Borries (VENRO)*

**Lehren aus Afghanistan: Raum für Gesellschafts-reformen schaffen**

*by Michael Daxner (SFB700)*

**Mehr deutsches Personal für Friedenseinsätze der Vereinten Nationen**

*by Daniel Maier (MONUSCO)*

**Leitbild „Gemeinsame Sicherheit“: Das Friedensgebot des Grundgesetzes konkretisieren**

*by Ulrich Frey (Platform for Peaceful Conflict Management)*

**Germany should prioritize mass atrocity prevention**

*by Simon Adams (Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect)*

**Prioritäten, Voraussetzungen und Gestaltungsansätze erfolgversprechender Krisenprävention**

*by Hans-Joachim Giessmann (Berghof Foundation)*

**Deutsches Tandem für Krisenprävention: Multilaterale Friedenseinsätze und proaktive Friedenspolitik**

*by Almut Wieland-Karimi (Center for International Peace Operations)*

**Creating Fit-for-Purpose Peacebuilding Evaluation: Three Key Investments**

*by Andrew Blum (University of San Diego)*

**Aus Erfahrung lernen: Transformationsprozesse als Lernprozesse verstehen**

*by Cornelia Brinkmann (Steps for Peace)*

**Deutsche Selbstlähmung beenden: Aktiv handeln und alle Optionen prüfen**

*by Klaus Naumann (former Chief of Defence, Bundeswehr)*

**Paris to Berlin: Just Do It!**

*by Manuel Lafont Rapnouil (ECFR Paris)*

**Keine Angst vor Evaluierungen!**

*by Andreas Wittkowsky (Center for International Peace Operations)*

**Ausweg oder Sackgasse? Die wachsende Verzahnung von humanitärer Hilfe und Friedensarbeit**

*by Marina Peter (Sudan und Südsudan Forum)*

**Wie eine bessere deutsche Afghanistanpolitik aussehen sollte**

*by Michael Daxner (Sonderforschungsbereich 700 der FU Berlin)*

**Eine feministische Außenpolitik für Deutschland!**

*by Sonja Schiffrers and Vera Lamprecht (Polis180)*

**Mein Freund der Warlord: Wer mit Militärs zusammenarbeitet, sollte sich seine Freunde gut aussuchen**

*by Steffen Eckhard (LMU Munich) and Marius Müller-Hennig (Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation)*

**Diplomaten an die Front! Krisenprävention braucht das richtige Personal**

*by Gerrit Kurtz (King's College London)*

**Eine Chance für mehr zivile Mittel, Politikkohärenz und Menschenrechte**

*by Elisabeth Strohscheidt (MISEREOR)*

**Militäreinsätze bringen keinen Frieden**

*by Wolfram Rohde-Liebenau (Ökumenisches Netz Bayern)*

**Relationship advice for crisis managers**

*by Richard Gowan (European Council on Foreign Relations)*

**Wegweiser Agenda 2030: Die Bundesregierung braucht einen Konflikt-TÜV!**

*by Christoph Bongard (Forum Civil Peace Service)*

**Kein Blick in die Kristallkugel: Early Action durch bessere Kommunikation und Entscheidungsorganisation**

*by Christoph Meyer (King's College London)*

**Tough but essential: Germany's political engagement with crisis prevention in Africa**

by *Comfort Ero (International Crisis Group)*

**Krisenprävention aus Sicht des Bundesministeriums des Innern (BMI)**

by *Thomas de Maizière (Federal Minister of the Interior)*

**Entwicklung ist der Schlüssel zur Vermeidung und Bewältigung von Krisen**

by *Gerd Müller (Federal Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development)*

**10 Tips for Increasing Political Engagement for SSR**

by *Thammy Evans (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, DCAF)*

**Ein Nationaler Sicherheitsberater – nur Zeremonienmeister oder Schlüsselfigur für eine ganzheitliche Sicherheitspolitik?**

by *Christian Thiels (ARD)*

**“It's the prevention, stupid!” Bausteine für ein besseres deutsches Krisenengagement**

by *Almut Wieland-Karimi (Center for International Peace Operations)*

**Eine verlorene Generation? Warum sich Investitionen in die Jugend lohnen**

by *Christoph Abels (Polis180)*

**A New Agenda for Peace: Start with a Look in the Mirror**

by *Jonathan Cohen (Conciliation Resources)*

**Zivile Krisenprävention verbessern: Der Beitrag der Friedens- und Konfliktforschung**

by *Nicole Deitelhoff and Christopher Daase (Peace Research Institute Frankfurt)*

**Der vernetzte Ansatz: Was Deutschland von den Vereinten Nationen lernen kann**

by *Ekkehard Griep (United Nations Association of Germany)*

**Towards An Integrated Approach to Conflicts and Crises: Germany's Central Role in European Conflict Prevention, Stabilization and Peacebuilding**

by *Helga Maria Schmid (European External Action Service)*

**„Ertüchtigung“ kritisch überprüfen: Keine Militärfinanzierung auf Kosten von Entwicklung**

by *Martina Fischer (Bread for the World)*

**Die Prävention von Massenverbrechen muss Priorität sein!**

by *Gregor Hofmann (Peace Research Institute Frankfurt)*

**Verzweifelt gesucht: Deutsche Polizei**

by *Edelgard Bulmahn, MP (Social Democratic Party, SPD)*

**A Double-Edged Sword: Targeted Sanctions as a Crisis Prevention Tool**

by *Marcos Tourinho (Fundação Getúlio Vargas)*

**Krisenprävention von den Zielen her denken**

by *Ursula Schröder (Freie Universität Berlin)*

**Der kulturellen Dimension der Friedensförderung mehr Beachtung schenken!**

by *Matthias Neef (German Commission for UNESCO)*

**Wie Menschenrechtsarbeit Konfliktursachen bekämpfen kann**

by *Beate Rudolf (German Institute for Human Rights)*

**Deutschlands neue Verantwortung: Konfliktprävention und Konfliktbearbeitung**

by *Stefan Liebich, MP (The Left)*

**Ein Thema für die Leitlinien: Abrüstung und Rüstungskontrolle**

by *Ute Finckh-Krämer, MP (Social Democratic Party, SPD)*

**Der „Primat des Politischen“: Was tun, wenn Ordnung zerfällt und Krisen sich häufen?**

by *Klaus Naumann (Hamburg Institute for Social Research)*

**„Aktion für den Frieden – statt Reaktion auf Krisen“**

by *the Civil Peace Service Consortium*

**Mehr Wissenschaft für bessere Politik? Hürden, Optionen und etwas Evidenz**

by *Lars Brozus (German Institute for International and Security Affairs)*

**Projektumsetzung in Krisengebieten: Herausforderungen, Lernerfahrungen, Perspektiven**

by *Tanja Gönner (GIZ)*

**“Business as usual” wird nicht reichen – Ein Plädoyer für die Stärkung internationaler Polizeieinsätze**

by *Annika Hansen (Center for International Peace Operations)*

**Geographische Schwerpunktsetzung – einen Anfang wagen!**

by *Mathias Krämer (University of the Federal Armed Forces Hamburg)*

**Geschlechterperspektive durchgehend in Leitlinien integrieren – Zugang zu Menschenrechten für Frauen fördern**

by *Anne Remschmid (German Institute for Human Rights)*

**Zivil-militärisches Krisenengagement: Neue Wege gehen, alte Hürden überwinden**

by *Ursula von der Leyen (Federal Minister of Defence)*

**Geduldige Zimmermannsarbeit: Den Dialog zwischen Friedensforschung und Politik produktiver gestalten**

by *Ulrich Schneckener (German Foundation for Peace Research)*

**Reaktion: Gegen den vernetzten Ansatz**

by *Jan Gildemeister (Aktionsgemeinschaft Dienst für den Frieden) and Wolfgang Burggraf (Evangelische Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Kriegsdienstverweigerung und Frieden)*

**Krisenprävention: Unsere Verantwortung als Parlamentarier**

by *Andreas Nick, MP (Christian Democratic Union, CDU)*

**Und wir sprechen doch dieselbe Sprache!**

by *Andreas Steinmetz (German Armed Forces Association)*

**Europäisch und abgestimmt: Zivile Krisenprävention und Konfliktbearbeitung als Markenkern unserer Außenpolitik**

by *Thorsten Frei, MP (Christian Democratic Union, CDU)*

**Privatwirtschaft systematisch in Krisenprävention und Friedensförderung integrieren**

by *Isabel Ebert (Business & Human Rights Resource Centre) and Maximilian Spohr (Friedrich-Naumann-Foundation)*

**Unsichtbares Nischenthema? Wer nicht streitet hat schon verloren!**

by *Sarah Brockmeier (Global Public Policy Institute)*

**Von Elefanten und Papiertigern in der Friedensmediation**

by *Lars Kirchhoff, Anne Isabel Kraus, and Julia von Döbeneck (Center for Peace Mediation)*

**Was wir von uns lernen sollten:**

**Rechtsstaatszusammenarbeit neu denken**

by *Markus Böckenförde (Centre for Global Cooperation Research)*

**Form follows function – auch in der internationalen Friedensförderung!**

by *Peter Mares (ifa)*

**Nur mit Kontext und Akteuren: Damit Instrumente auch so wirken, wie sie sollen!**

*by Miriam M. Müller (Hamburg Institute for Social Research)*

**No peace without peace education and education reform**

*by Katja Anger (OECD)*

**Without Democracy, No Human Rights and No Peace**

*by Katrin Kinzelbach (Global Public Policy Institute)*

**Globalisierung gerechter gestalten: Was Wirtschaftspolitik zur Krisenprävention beitragen kann**

*by Sigmar Gabriel (Federal Minister for Economic Affairs and Energy)*

**Mut zu mehr Prävention: Eine Zwischenbilanz des PeaceLab-Prozesses**

*by Frank-Walter Steinmeier (Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs)*

**Die Förderung von Rechtsstaatlichkeit: Nachhaltige Krisenprävention im deutschen Interesse**

*by Matthias Kötter (WZB Berlin Social Science Center)*

**Reflexion und Selbstbindung: Was Deutschland mit den Leitlinien gewinnen kann**

*by Jörn Grävingsholt (Advisory Board for Civilian Crisis Prevention)*

**Lokal ansetzen: Beispiele für erfolgreiche zivile Konfliktbearbeitung aus der Praxis**

*by Thomas Rößer (DVV International)*

**Ein neuer Fixpunkt für die Krisenprävention: Afrikas Jugend**

*by Isabel Pfaff (SZ)*

**Stabilisierung in akuten Krisen: Strategisch, eigenständig und komplementär**

*by Philipp Reder (GIZ), Sven Schneider (Foreign Office) and Robin Schroeder (ISPK)*

**Haltung zeigen: Mit langfristiger Politikkohärenz Menschenrechte schützen und Frieden fördern**

*by Catherine Devaux (Amnesty International)*

**Zentral für die Krisenprävention: Ein weltweites Atomwaffenverbot**

*by Susanne Grabenhorst and Xanthe Hall (IPPNW)*

**Friedensförderung: Ein Konzept für die deutsche internationale Politik – kein Instrument des Krisenmanagements**

*by Cay Gabbe (former German public servant)*

**Höchste Priorität für Friedenssicherung durch Konfliktprävention**

*by Otmar Steinbicker (Darmstädter Signal)*

**Konditionalität als Mittel zur nachhaltigen Transformation**

*by Valeska Esch (Aspen Institute)*

**Augen auf bei der Partnerwahl! Regionalorganisationen als Partner für die Friedenssicherung**

*by Ingo Hemeberg (University of Freiburg)*

**Von der Notfallbehandlung zur Vorsorge: Krisenprävention und Friedensförderung stärken**

*by Rüdiger König (Foreign Office)*

**„Den Vereinten Nationen wesentlich mehr Ressourcen zur Verfügung stellen“**

*by the United Nations Association of Germany*

**Frühwarnung weiter denken: Errichtung einer digitalen Vorhersageplattform**

*by Jens Stappenbeck (Genocide Alert)*

**Krisenprävention und Rüstungslieferungen: Von der Notwendigkeit, genau hinzuschauen**

*by Sebastian Nieke and Jan Fuhrmann (BSH)*

**Ressortzusammenarbeit aus Sicht eines Offiziers der Bundeswehr: Für ein besseres Miteinander**

*by Marcel Bohnert (German Armed Forces)*

**Stürmische Zeiten am East River: Deutsches Engagement dringend gebraucht**

*by Céline-Agathe Caro, Dustin Dehez, Patrick Keller and Jana Puglierin (KAS)*

**To Prevent another Syria, the World Needs German Leadership**

*by Tod Lindberg (Hoover Institution)*

**Milliarden statt Millionen für zivile Konfliktlösung: Antwort auf Marcel Bohnert**

*by Lutz Krügener (Evangelical-Lutheran Church of Hanover)*

**Krisenprävention bedarf reflexiver Formen der Außenpolitikberatung**

*by Christoph Weller (University of Augsburg)*

**Wie ein Frieden verspielt wird: Das Beispiel El Salvador**

*by Sabine Kurtenbach (GIGA Institute of Latin American Studies)*

**Will 2017 Be a Watershed Year for Prevention at the Service of Peace?**

*by Youssef Mahmoud (International Peace Institute)*

**Die Welt zu Gast im deutschen Wahlkampf: Zwei Prozent mehr Ideen?**

*by Philipp Rotmann (Global Public Policy Institute)*

**Wie Deutschland syrische Kriegsverbrecher vor Gericht stellen kann**

*by Pauline Brosch (Global Public Policy Institute)*

**Ohne Diplomaten keine diplomatischen Lösungen**

*by Sarah Brockmeier (Global Public Policy Institute)*

**Deutsches Engagement in Mali: Hilfe an politische Forderungen knüpfen**

*by Melanie Hauenstein (Center for International Peace Operations)*

**Friedensförderung: Die Expertise religiöser Akteure nutzen!**

*by Markus Weingardt (Global Ethic Foundation)*

**Development as an Ecosystem: How Aid Programs Can Stimulate Change**

*by Erwin van Veen (Clingendael Institute)*

**Moving from Peacekeeping to Prevention at the UN: Opportunities for Europe**

*by Richard Gowan (European Council on Foreign Relations)*

**Krisenprävention und Menschenrechtsschutz – zur Rolle von Unternehmen**

*by Bärbel Kofler, MP (Social Democratic Party, SPD)*

**Internationale rechtliche Zusammenarbeit für zivile Krisenprävention und Konfliktnachsorge**

*by Heiko Maas (Federal Minister of Justice and Consumer Protection)*

**Ein „Verzahnungsdogma“ in der Krisenprävention wäre schädlich**

*by Bärbel Dieckmann (Welthungerhilfe)*

**Das Ende westlicher Arroganz**

*by Thorsten Benner (Global Public Policy Institute)*

**Deutschlands Verantwortung in der Welt? Friedensförderung!**

*by Bread for the World, MISEREOR, Forum Menschenrechte, Platform for Peaceful Conflict Management, and Civil Peace Service Consortium*

**Mission Impossible? Lessons from UN Peacekeeping in South Sudan**

*by Elisa Lux (ehem. Vereinte Nationen)*

**Managing Conflict, Building Peace: Opportunities for Europe and India**

*by Garima Mohan (Global Public Policy Institute)*

**Aus dem „PeaceLab“ in die Praxis: Die Leitlinien als Kompass**

*by Sigmar Gabriel (Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs)*

# Overview of PeaceLab2016

## Events

- JULY**
- Auftaktveranstaltung PeaceLab2016: Krisenprävention weiter denken**  
*Foreign Office, Berlin, 5 July 2016*
- Implementing the SDGs in Fragile Countries**  
*Working Group on Peace and Development (FriEnt) & Civil Society Platform for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (CSPPS), Berlin, 8 July 2016*
- SEPTEMBER**
- Leitbild Friedensgestaltung in den neuen Leitlinien**  
*The Protestant Academies in Germany & Advisory Board for Civilian Crisis Prevention, Berlin, 6 September 2016*
- Agenda 2030, ziviles Krisenengagement und Friedensförderung**  
*Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), Berlin, 8 September 2016*
- The ‘Technocracy Trap’ of State-Building – How to Improve the Effectiveness and Legitimacy of Security and Justice Sector Reforms**  
*Collaborative Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, 14 September 2016*
- Pathways to just and sustainable peace: How can international actors support transitional justice processes?**  
*Working Group on Peace and Development (FriEnt), Berlin, 27 September 2016*
- OCTOBER**
- Zivilgesellschaft als Akteur zur Prävention von Gewaltkonflikten und für Friedensförderung**  
*Platform for Peaceful Conflict Management, Forum Menschenrechte, Association of Development and Humanitarian Aid NGOs in Germany (VENRO) & Civil Peace Service Consortium, Berlin, 5 October 2016*
- Deutschland in den Vereinten Nationen: Erwartungen – Möglichkeiten – Ziele**  
*United Nations Association of Germany (DGVN) & German Atlantic Association (DAG), Berlin, 5 October 2016*
- Youth in Conflict**  
*Polis180, Berlin, 6 October 2016*
- OCTOBER**
- Perspektiven des zivil-militärischen Krisenmanagements**  
*Federal Ministry of Defence (BMVg) & Federal Academy for Security Policy (BAKS), Berlin, 12 October 2016*
- Stabilisation of (Post-)Conflict Zones: Perspectives of International Organizations & Implications for Germany**  
*Institute for Security Policy at Kiel University (ISPK) & Vesalius College, Brussels, 13 October 2016*
- Stabilization Instruments Revisited: Increasing the Likelihood of Positive Impact**  
*Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF), Berlin, 19 October 2016*
- Preventing Crises, Preventing Atrocities: Lessons & Opportunities for Transatlantic Cooperation**  
*Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi), Genocide Alert, Stanley Foundation & US Holocaust Memorial Museum, Berlin, 20 October 2016*
- Early Warning – Early Action Dialogue on Lessons Learnt and Way Forward for the United Nations**  
*Foreign Office & International Crisis Group, Berlin, 25 October 2016*
- Early Warning – Early Action Workshop on Missed Opportunities on Early Warning in Burundi and South Sudan**  
*Foreign Office, Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) & Foresight Intelligence, Berlin, 26 October 2016*
- Krisenprävention und Rüstungslieferungen – Passt das zusammen?**  
*Academic Association for Security Studies (BSH), Heidelberg, 27 October 2016*
- NOVEMBER**
- Friedens- und Konfliktforschung im Dialog**  
*German Foundation for Peace Research (DSF) & Advisory Board for Civilian Crisis Prevention, Berlin, 8 November 2016*
- The Future of EU crisis management: What expectations for Germany?**  
*Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation (EU office), Brussels, 11 November 2016*
- NOVEMBER**
- Machtteilung in Nachkriegs- und Nachkrisengesellschaften**  
*German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA) & Institute for Peace Re-search and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH), Hamburg, 16 November 2016*
- Zwischen Anspruch und Wirklichkeit: wie werden politische und soziale Zielsetzungen in Krisengebieten umgesetzt?**  
*Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), Welthungerhilfe (WHH), Help – Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe & KfW Group, Berlin, 17 November 2016*
- Eckpunkte deutscher Friedensmediation und Mediationsupport**  
*Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF), Berlin, 22 November 2016*
- Fachgespräch Leitlinien Krisenengagement und Friedensförderung**  
*Federation of German Industries (BDI), Berlin, 22 November 2016*
- Youth, Peace & Security: Junge Menschen in der Krisenprävention**  
*Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi), Bonn, 26 November 2016*
- How Germany can prevent the next refugee crisis**  
*Körber Foundation, Foreign Office & Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi), Berlin, 29 November 2016*
- DECEMBER**
- Leitlinien Konfliktprävention / Friedensförderung**  
*Hamburg Institute for Social Research, Hamburg, 5 December 2016*
- Enhancing Women’s Leadership for Sustainable Peace in Fragile Contexts in the MENA Region**  
*Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) & UN Women, Berlin, 13 December 2016*
- Irak nach ISIS – Lehren für Krisenengagement und Stabilisierung**  
*Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation (KAS), Berlin, 14 December 2016*



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